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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues for appeal in this matter, and their accompanying standards of review 
are: 
1) In imputing income, did the Trial Court hold the requisite hearing and 
make the requisite finding that Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed? The applicable statute (78-45-7.5(7)(a) mandates that a 
hearing be held and a finding made that a parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed before income can be imputed to a parent. 
In this case, there was no hearing held addressing the issue of whether 
Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, and no finding 
made that the Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
There was no evidence presented to permit the court to make such a 
finding. The Trial Court must abide by the statute authorizing the court 
to impute income; failure to abide by the law is reversible error. The 
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Trial Court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so 
constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d 476, 478 
(Utah App. 1988). 
Findings made by trial court regarding amount of income to impute 
to party in divorce action for purposes of child support award do not 
become relevant until after court determines, as threshold matter, that 
income should be imputed because party is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The Trial Court failed to enter any findings required under Section 
(7)(a). The findings on the whole are insufficient if they omit critical 
findings required by the statute. Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 
(Utah App. 1990). Failure of the Trial Court to consider and make 
findings on statutorily mandated factors is itself an abuse of discretion. 
Jeffries v. Jeffries. 752 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah App. 1988). 
Findings on the whole are insufficient if they omit critical finding s 
required by statute governing imputation of income for purpose of child 
support. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1993). 
It is well established that where a statute expressly requires a Trial 
Court to make a threshold finding before taking specified judicial action, 
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the Trial Court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first making the 
legislatively mandated finding. See Hill v. HilK 841 P.2d 722, 724-25 
(Utah App. 1992). 
Trial court's decision to impute income to husband for purposes of 
child support and alimony awards without making any explicit finding 
that husband was underemployed or any subsidiary findings that pointed 
to such determination have been made implicitly was substantial departure 
from procedure mandated by Legislature and could not be justified merely 
as failure to parrot exact language prescribed by statute. Hall v. HalL 858 
P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1993). 
In imputing income, did the Trial Court impute income based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for person of similar 
backgrounds in the community, as required by statute? Appellant 
additionally argues that even assuming the propriety of imputing 
additional income to him, the Trial Court incorrectly fixed the amount of 
income to impute as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1992). 
That section provides that: 
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based upon employment potential and probable 
3 
earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community-
Appellant specifically assigns error to the court's failure to 
adequately address "employment potential and probable earnings/1 The 
statute authorizing the courts to impute income mandates to the courts that 
income be imputed based upon employment potential and probable 
earnings. The Trial Court arbitrarily imputed income and then stated it 
was based upon current and historical earnings in spite of the fact that 
current earnings and actual historical earnings were far below the imputed 
amount. The Trial Court failed to follow the prescribed procedure 
mandated by the Legislature. There was no evidence presented to impute 
income based upon defendant's "employment potential and probable 
earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and 
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community." 
The Trial Court made no findings explicit or implicit, concerning 
"prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community" 
as required by Section (7)(b), but arbitrarily ruled that Defendant has 
imputed earning capacity in an amount at least equal to that of the 
Plaintiff. 
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Trialjbourt's failure to make findings, explicit or implicit, 
concerning prevailing earnings for persons in community with similar 
backgrounds to husband in order to correctly fix amount of income to 
impute to husband for purposes of child support, assuming propriety of so 
imputing income to husband, was improper. Court of Appeals could not 
disregard statutory mandate to make such findings solely on basis of 
litigant's unique circumstances. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1020 (Utah App. 
1993) 
The Trial Court must make findings on all material issues; failure to 
do so constitutes reversible error Andersen v. Andersen. 757 P.2d 
476,478 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The court is not at liberty to utilize the authority of the statute to 
impute income, and then ignore the specific requirements prescribed for 
the use of such authority. 
If on remand trial court finds, that husband was voluntarily 
underemployed, it was then required to make findings as to prevailing 
earnings for persons of backgound similar to that of husband in 
determining amount of income to impute to husband for purposes of child 
support. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1993). 
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Whether the Trial Court's basis for imputing income is based on non-
relevant, erroneous, and controverted evidence that is insufficient to 
support the findings? The findings made by the Trial Court regarding the 
amount of income to impute, per Section (7)(b), do not become relevant 
until after it determines, as a threshold matter, that income should be 
imputed because the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, 
as required by Section (7)(a). Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Because evidence in divorce action was not clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only finding in favor of judgement imputing 
income to husband for purposes of determing child support, trial court's 
decision to impute income could not be affirmed on basis of undisputed 
evidence in record; parties hotly contested adequacy of husband's efforts 
to find more gainful employment and at least some evidence suggested 
that husband's current, diminished income level resulted not from his 
personal perference or voluntary decisions, but instead resulted from 
events beyond his control. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1993). 
Accordingly, because the evidence in this case is not "clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
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judgment," we cannot affirm on the basis of undisputed evidence in 
record. Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes are determinative of the issues herein: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7-5(6): 
Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under 
Subsection (7). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-7.5(7): 
(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is 
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based upon employment potential and probable 
earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the procedures mandated by law for the imputation of 
income to a parent for the purposes of calculating such parent's child support 
obligation pursuant to the Utah Child Support Guidelines, 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Appeal is taken from the Decree of Divorce of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for Wasatch County, State of Utah, entered by Judge Ray M. 
Harding, and filed on September 28, 1993. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court calculated Appellant's child support obligation based 
upon income imputed to the Defendant/Appellant at an amount equal to that of 
the Plaintiff. There was no hearing held on the issue, nor were any findings 
made that Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. A finding 
was made that Defendant has imputed earning capacity in an amount at least 
equal to that of Plaintiff. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
1) The Trial Court imputed income to Defendant in an amount equal to 
Plaintiffs income. 
2) Court imputed income to Defendant based on historical earnings, present 
earnings, and the equity value in two homes generated by his work. 
3) Defendant's current income and historical income was presented at trial 
and is considerably lower than Plaintiff's income. 
4) Plaintiff had already received clear title to one of the homes almost three 
years prior to trial in a distribution of assets; giving her the entire equity 
value of the home, free and clear of any incumberances. 
5) The equity value in the home the Plaintiff received was created from over 
a year's work from the Defendant in building the home. 
6) The mortgage on Plaintiff's home was paid off from equity from the sale 
of the parties' prior home. That equity also came from Defendant's labor. 
7) The division of property was not equal. Plaintiff received a 
disproportionate share of equity in the home. Credit is due Defendant for 
his share of the equity that Plaintiff received in the home. 
8) Defendant moved from out of state to live and work with/near his 
children. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: IN IMPUTING INCOME, DID THE TRIAL COURT HOLD THE 
REQUISITE HEARING AND MAKE THE REQUISITE FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT WAS VOLUNTARILY UNEMPLOYED OR 
UNDEREMPLOYED? 
The Trial Court did not hold the requisite hearing and make the requisite 
finding that Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
It is necessary and appropriate that, in imputing income to an individual for the 
purposes of calculating child support based upon the Utah Child Support 
Guidelines, the statute authorizing the same be strictly complied with in order to 
prevent injustice. The Court does not have the liberty to alter that which is 
required by statute. The Court abuses its discretion if it proceeds without first 
making the legislatively mandated finding. 
POINT 2: IN IMPUTING INCOME, DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPUTE 
INCOME BASED UPON EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL AND 
PROBABLE EARNINGS AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE? 
The Trial Court did not impute income based upon employment potential 
and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar background in the community as 
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required by statute. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in imputing income due 
to its failure to comply with the requirements of the law, 
POINT 3: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURTS BASIS FOR IMPUTING 
INCOME IS BASED ON NON-RELEVANT, ERRONEOUS, AND 
CONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS? 
The Trial Court's finding Number 5 states that imputed earning capacity 
was based upon historical earnings, present earnings, and the equity value in the 
two homes generated by his work. 
The Trial Court states this as a basis to impute earning capacity, when in 
fact, evidence presented at trial contradicts and does not support the conclusion. 
The Defendant's current income and historical income is considerably lower 
than Plaintiff's income. In addition, Plaintiff had already received clear title to 
one of the above-mentioned homes almost three years prior to trial in a 
distribution of assets, giving her the entire equity value of the home, free and 
clear of any incumberances. Clearly the Trial Court has abused its discretion in 
not considering the facts and evidence presented to support its findings. 
11 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1: IN IMPUTING INCOME, DID THE TRIAL COURT HOLD THE 
REQUISITE HEARING AND MAKE THE REQUISITE FINDING, 
AS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTE, THAT 
APPELLANT WAS VOLUNTARILY UNEMPLOYED OR 
UNDEREMPLOYED? 
The legislature has specifically authorized the Courts to impute income to 
a parent for the purposes of calculating a parent's child support obligation under 
the Utah Child Support Guidelines; UCA 78-45-7.5(6) states: 
Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
In granting such authority, however, the legislature has required that, in 
order for a Court to impute income to a parent, a hearing must be held and a 
finding must be made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed; UCA 78-45-7.5(7)(a) states: 
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent 
stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing held is held and a 
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. 
In fact, the applicable statute specifically mandates that: "Income may not 
be imputed to a parent..." {emphasis added} unless the requirements of the 
statute are complied with. Accordingly, by statute, the Court "may not" impute 
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income unless a hearing is held and an appropriate finding is made. The Court 
has no discretion to do what is specifically unauthorized by the law. 
In the instant case, there was no requisite hearing held to determine 
whether the Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Further, 
there was no finding made, as is required by statute, that the Appellant was 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Accordingly, by law, the court has 
no discretion and can not impute income to the Appellant. The applicable 
statute is addressed specifically to the court and is clear in its mandate; the court 
is not at liberty to break or ignore the specifically mandated requirements of the 
law. Accordingly, the Trial Court had no authority to impute income to the 
Appellant. 
It is well established by the courts that the failure to comply with the law 
is against the law. The statute specifically states: "Income may not be imputed 
to a parent unless..." The requirements of the law must be recognized and 
upheld by the legal system itself or the "presumption of [the] validity" of the 
laws themselves lose their merit. The validity of the laws would lose their merit 
if the guardian of the law, the courts, ignored the requirements of the laws. 
Unless, and until, that statute is determined to be unconstitutional, it applies; and 
it mandates to the court that: "Income may not be imputed to a parent unless..." 
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"the requirements are met. 
The requirements in the statute are a mandate—they are not discretionary; 
the Trial Court, in such a matter, has no discretion. If this court can say that it 
is not an abuse of discretion to ignore the demands of the law as authorized by 
the people through its legislature, then there is, nor can there be, any external 
limitation on the discretion of the court. The court would simply be a law unto 
itself. The court would be free to act as it pleases and to pick and choose those 
laws with which it desired to comply and those laws which it desired to 
disdainfully ignore. If we say that we are a society governed by the laws made 
by the people through its legislature, and no one is above the law—not even 
judges in carrying out the law—only then, can we say that we are a government 
OF THE PEOPLE. 
This failure of the Trial Court to hold the statutorily mandated hearing 
and make the required finding is reversible error. I can see no greater abuse of 
discretion by the court than to have the court disdainfully ignore the explicit 
statutory mandate of the law that a hearing and a finding in such matters are 
non-discretionary. The statute specifically states that: "Income may not be 
imputed to a parent unless,,," the specific requirements are complied with by the 
Trial Court, 
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The potential injustice which can occur in improperly imputing income is 
tremendous. The Legislative Branch has gone through all of the trouble to 
specify the requirements it has established to seek to protect the improper use of 
this tremendous power. We complain of the Legislative Branch because it 
doesn't provide enough guidance to the court in applying its laws; then, when it 
makes the effort to spell it out for the court's use and eliminate the guesswork, 
the court disregards what the legislature has so painstakingly put together for the 
court's behalf. 
The court has no discretion in the applicability of this requirement which 
requirement is directed to no other entity than the court The requirement in the 
statute is a mandate-not within the realm of discretion; in this instance, the 
court has no discretion. 
In the precedent case, Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the 
Court of Appeals has sent the proper message that the law must be complied 
with in imputing income to a parent. In the precedent case, as in this case, the 
Trial Court did not hold a hearing on the issue, nor did the Trial Court make the 
requisite finding that the Appellant was voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. Accordingly, by law, the Trial Court could not impute income 
to the Appellant. The Court of Appeals agreed. Because the findings before us 
15 
do not include any findings to the effect that Appellant was voluntarily 
underemployed, they are statutorily insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah App. 1993). 
In upholding the law, the Court of Appeals should reverse the lower 
court's determination and require that child support be calculated on Defendant's 
actual income according to the child support guidelines mandated by the 
legislature. 
POINT 2: IN IMPUTING INCOME. DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPUTE 
INCOME BASED UPON EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL AND 
PROBABLE EARNINGS AS REQUIRED BY STATUTE? 
Once the requisite hearing has been held and the required finding made 
that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, the court is obligated 
to impute income "based upon employemnt potential and probable earnings." 
The legislature, in authorizing the courts to impute income, has mandated the 
method to be utilized in imputing income; the statute 78-45-7.5 (7)(b) reads: 
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work 
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for 
persons of similar backgrounds in the community. 
The statute prescribes two factors which must be determined in order to 
impute income. First, that income is to be imputed based upon "employment 
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potential"--which means the likelihood of such individual being employed if 
such individual were voluntarily unemployed, and in what capacity would such 
individual likely be employed, or, in the alternative, in what capacity should 
such individual be employed if such individual were voluntarily underemployed. 
Second, that income is to be imputed based upon the "probable earnings11 
of such an individual-which means, in other words, what earnings would such 
an individual likely earn while employed in such capacity. 
The legislature has specified and, thereby, limited the factors which are to 
be considered in deriving "employment potential and probable earnings". In 
determining "employment potential and probable earnings," the Trial Court is 
required, by statute, to derive its conclusions from: "work history, occupational 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community/1 The legislature has specified that these three factors must be 
addressed by the courts in deriving "employment potential and probable 
earnings." Again, the statute specifies that the consideration of such factors is 
not optional and within the discretion of the court, but mandates that imputed 
"income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings as 
derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for 
persons of similar backgrounds in the community." {emphasis added} 
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The statute is not vague, and it is not ambiguous; there is no difficulty in 
reading exactly what the statute provides and exactly what the statute requires. 
The court is not at liberty to exclude that which is specifically required by law. 
The court is not at liberty to utilize the authority of the statute to impute income 
and, then, ignore the specific requirements prescribed for the use of such 
authority. 
The legislature has granted the authority only as delineated by the statute-
-otherwise, the court has no authority; in this instance, the legislature has gone 
into great detail and specifically articulated the requirements mandating in what 
manner and under what specific conditions that authority is to be used. The 
purposes of these requirements have been addressed by the legislature and are 
mandated in order to protect the rights of the people in the interests of justice. 
The court is not at liberty to alter, amend, or ignore these mandated 
requirements—unless, and only to the extent that, such mandates are in some 
way unconstitutional. The courts are to apply the law to specific instances—not 
to ignore or modify the law. This statute as passed by the legislature OF THE 
PEOPLE is the LAW and is to be properly honored and upheld by the courts in 
the administration of justice; there can be no justice if the law is not complied 
with under the guise of ''discretion". 
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In the instant case, there was no finding that the Defendant was 
unemployed. There was no evidence presented at trial that the Defendant was 
voluntarily underemployed- There was no finding made in the instant case that 
the Defendant was volunarily underemployed- The statute requires that the 
imputed income "be based upon employment potential and probable earnings-" 
There was no evidence that imputed income was in any way indicative of 
employment potential and probable earnings- The evidence shows that imputed 
income was far greater than current income and historical income. 
In Woodward v- Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477(Utah App- 1991), the court 
stated: 
If we are to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial 
supports the trial court's findings, the findings must embody 
sufficient detail and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show 
the evidence upon which they are grounded. 
* * * 
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence 
when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be 
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations-
The burden of proof is, obviously, on the party seeking to ascribe income 
to another. All of the factors required by statute to be used by the court in 
deriving an individual's "employment potential and probable earnings" must be 
presented before the court by such party to allow the court to properly consider 
all of the specified factors required in deriving the "employment potential and 
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probable earnings" of an individual against whom the income is sought to be 
imputed. 
There was no evidence presented or finding made that such imputed 
income was indicative of Defendant's "employment potential and probable 
earnings/1 No evidence was provided indicating Defendant's occupational 
qualifications would permit him to obtain more lucrative employment. No 
evidence was presented which would substantiate that earnings imputed to the 
Defendant as being consistent with prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. The Plaintiff simply failed to establish its 
burden of proof and no findings were made by the court. This was true in the 
instant case as well as the precedent case, Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah 
App. (1993), where the Court of Appeals upheld the mandated statute and 
states: 
[If] "the Trial Court finds that appellant was voluntarily 
underemployed, it must then make findings as to prevailing earnings 
for persons of backgrounds similar to that of appellant, as required 
by Section (7)(b), in determining the amount of income to impute". 
POINT 3: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S BASIS FOR IMPUTING 
INCOME IS BASED ON NON-RELEVENT, ERRONEOUS. AND 
CONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS? 
20 
The Trial Court erred in imputing income without first determining that 
Defendant was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed as required under 
(7)(a). Additionally, in fixing the amount of income to be imputed, the Trial 
Court failed to follow statutory directives in assessing his employment potential 
and probable earnings as required under (7)(b). Thus, the findings are not 
adequate to impute income. Because the findings are inadequate and irrelevant, 
Point 3 becomes unnecessary. Even so, the Appellant wishes to point out the 
injustice and arbitrary nature of the Trial Court in imputing income. 
The Trial Court's finding Number 5 states that imputed earning capacity 
was based upon historical earnings, present earnings, and the equity value in the 
two homes generated by his work. In the transcript on pages 31-33, 
Defendant's annual earnings were read as stated under oath in the interrogatories 
and shown in Exhibit #4. The annual earnings for the prior eight years (1984 
through 1991) showed historical income averaged less than $10,000 per year. 
Current earnings for the year 1992 were less than $5,000, With this undisputed 
evidence presented at trial, historical earnings and present earnings cannot be 
used as a basis to justify imputing an income of $25,000 per year. The 
evidence does not support the findings. 
21 
The findings also state that the imputation was based on the equity value 
of two homes. The Plaintiff had already received clear title to one of the above-
mentioned homes almost three years prior to trial in a distribution of assets, 
giving her the entire equity value of the home, free and clear of any 
incumberances. The equity value in the home the Plaintiff received was created 
from over a year's work from the Defendant in building the home. The 
mortgage on the Plaintiffs home was paid off from equity from the sale of the 
parties' prior home. That equity also came from Defendant's labor in building 
that home. 
The Trial Court was also aware of this as the Plaintiff testified on p. 34 of 
the transcript, starting on line 8, 
Q. and you're also aware, are you not, that that home is valued at 
approximately $100,000? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you received that home fully — I mean you received all 
interest in that home without any mortgage payments? 
A. That's right. 
Q. So you haven't made any mortgage payments on that home, 
have you? 
A. No. 
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The Trial Court was also made aware of the unequal distribution of assets 
when the Defendant deeded the home to the Plaintiff and paid off her mortgage. 
Quoting from Defendant's testimony on p. 48 in the transcript on line 22, 
A. I received the $59,000 for giving her the deed to the house that 
she resides in. 
Q. Your understanding is she got a house worth $100,000 and you 
got $59,000 net from that sale? 
A.Yes. 
The Trial Court was made aware of the fact that the Plaintiff received all 
of the equity derived from Defendant's efforts, allowing the Plaintiff to live 
comfortably without a house payment. Credit is due the Defendant for his share 
of the equity that the Plaintiff received in the home, not the reverse. With this 
knowledge, the court used this equity given to the Plaintiff as a basis to impute 
a greater child support payment, also to be given to the Plaintiff. This cannot 
be justified. Clearly, the Trial Court has abused its discretion. The facts and 
evidence presented contradict the Trial Court's findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The potential for injustice and the potentially devastating ramifications of 
an improperly imputed income are tremendous. In recognition of the potential 
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for abuse, the legislature has mandated procedures and requirements that must 
be complied with in order to protect the citizens of our community from 
devastating abuses. These mandated procedures are not discretionary* 
The Trial Court made several errors in the instant case. The Utah Appellate 
Court should use this opportunity to correct those errors as it has done 
previously in the precedent-setting case Hall v. Hall to ensure that they are not 
perpetuated. Appropriate matters should be reversed by this court. This court 
must once again consider the message it wishes to disseminate regarding the use 
of this powerful tool for imputing income. The use of such a tool must be 
based upon the specific requirements mandated by the statute creating that tool 
to ensure the prevention of the abuse of such authority. 
It is imperative that, in utilizing the authority granted to it by the 
legislature, the Trial Court follow the procedures and comply with the specified 
requirements mandated by the legislature in granting such authority. 
The issues presented have been clearly established in previous precedent-setting 
case law, i.e., Hall v. Hall. I would only ask the court to apply such case law to 
the instant case, and again reverse the Trial Court's decision for lack of 
adequate findings. 
The Appellant wishes to thank this court for its review of these issues 
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which have significant and long-lasting consequences on Appellant's life. In the 
interest of truth and justice, Appellant respectfully requests this court to reverse 
the Trial Court's decision. 
The Appellant also wishes to apologize for his shortcomings in presenting 
this case pro se. Appellant has no legal expertise in these matters, but is doing 
so because of his strong compulsion to correct the gross error and injustice that 
has occurred. The Appellant cannot afford the great sums of money needed for 
professional legal counsel. This prohibitive cost would have made an appeal 
impossible. 
The Appellant must confess that most of the material presented has been 
taken from the precedent case Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993). 
Without this material and guidance, Appellant would have been unable to 
present his case without professional legal representation. With this in mind, 
Appellant sincerely hopes the court will focus on the facts and principles of the 
matter, and will be tolerant of Appellant's shortcomings and lack of legal 
expertise. 
S I G ^ ^ A N D D / g ^ D this J?Y~£ day of May 1994. 
Vincerif J. Villella, II 
Attorney Pro Se/Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief 
was mailed first-class to: 
Wendy Hufhagel, Attorney for PlaintiffyRespondent, 190 North Main Street, 
Suite 200, Heber City, UT 84032. 
SIGNER ANDJpATED this / ^ day of May 1994. 
Vincerff J. Villella, II 
Wendy Hufnagel USB 1568 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
190 North Main Street, Suite 200 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Telephone (801)654-5700 
Facsimile (801)654-5701 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN MARY VILLELLA, * Judge Ray M. Harding 
Plaintiff, 
=vs= * FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
VINCENT JAMES VILLELLA II, 
Defendant. * Civil No. 6621 
THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Fourth 
District Court for trial; the Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney, Wendy 
Hufnagel; the Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney, Richard Nemelka; the 
Court having heard and considered the testimony of Plaintiff and of Defendant, having 
reviewed and considered the various exhibits offered in the course of the trial, and the Court 
having heretofore having conducted in chambers interviews of the minor children; and the 
Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes the following Findings of 
Fact: 
[1] Plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Wasatch County, State of Utah, and has 
1 
been for more than three (3) months immediately preceding the commencement of this 
action for divorce. 
[2] Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having intermarried January 
18, 1964, in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
[3] Seven children have been born as issue of this marriage, five of whom 
remain minors, to-wit: David Anthony, born September 4, 1975; Daniel John, born July 2, 
1977; Lisa Marie, born October 19,1978; Maria Christine, born February 13,1981; and Sara 
Jean, born July 16, 1982. 
[4] The Court having interviewed the children and considered all of the other 
evidence in this case determines that it is in the best interests of the minor children that 
Plaintiff be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children David Anthony, 
Lisa Marie, Maria Christine and Sara Jean, and that Defendant be awarded the care, 
custody and control of the minor child Daniel John, subject to the non-custodial parent's 
right of visitation at reasonable times upon reasonable notice. 
[5] Defendant's historical earnings since 1988 are not indicative of his 
historical earnings. Defendant is a licensed contractor, and in the past has also been a 
licensed contractor. He has had sufficient earnings to acquire a substantial estate, has over 
the past three years built two homes and created substantial equity in both. Based upon his 
historical earnings, his admitted present earnings, and the equity value in the two homes 
generated by his work, the Court finds that Defendant has imputed earning capacity in an 
amount at least equal to that of Plaintiff, who is employed as a school teacher with a gross 
2 
income of two thousand and eighty-three dollars ($2,083.00) per month. 
[6] It is reasonable therefore that Defendant should be ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff the sum of three hundred and fifty-seven dollars ($357.00) per month commencing 
with the month of January, 1993, and continuing monthly thereafter, one-half of which shall 
be due on or before the fifth day of each month, and one-half of which shall be due on the 
twentieth day of each month. No child support shall be awarded for any arrearage prior to 
January, 1993. 
WHEREFORE HAVING MADE and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
the Court now reaches the following Conclusions of Law: 
[1] Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from Defendant upon the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
heretofore existing between the parties and restoring each to the status of a single person, 
same to become final upon entry in the Register of Actions. 
[2] Said Decree should incorporate the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED THIS £J day of ^ ^ , nineteen hundred 
and ninety-three. 
3 
Approved as to form: 
NOTE: 
Defendant's attorney was not 
able to review and approve 
Findings and Degree because 
they were never sent to him 
as certified by Plaintiff's 
attorney. 
Richard S, Nemelka 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IN COMPLIANCE WITH Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration, I do 
hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard S. Nemelka, Attorney for Defendant, 2046 
Ease 4800 South, Suite 103, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, this /ffif&y of April, nineteen 
hundred and ninety-three. 
Wendy Hufhage 
Attorney /toy Plaintiff 
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Alaska court's conclusion." Gale v. State, 
792 P.2d 570, 588 (Wyo.1990); Jimenez v. 
State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 694, 697 
(1989); State v. Gorton, 149 Vt. 602, 548 
A.2d 419, 421 (1988); People v. Raibon, 843 
P.2d 46, 49 (Colo.App.1992), See e.g. State 
v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P.2d 455, 
462 (1991) (concurring opinion); State v. 
Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. 503, 820 R2d 960, 
961-63 (1991); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 
201, 208 (Miss.1988). Absent legislation or 
precedent from the Utah Supreme Court, 
we do not believe it would be appropriate to 
require, by judicial fiat, that all statements 
taken of a person in custody be recorded or 
transcribed. Everette, 135 IlLDec. at 479, 
543 N.E.2d at 1047. 
Although, in accord with other courts, 
we refrain from requiring recording of in-
terrogations under the Utah Constitution, 
we note several policy reasons for record-
ing interrogations. These include avoiding 
unwarranted claims of coercion and avoid-
ing actual coercive tactics by police. In 
addition, recording an interrogation may 
show the "voluntariness of the confession, 
the context in which a particular statement 
was made, and . . . the actual content of 
the statement." Williams, 522 So.2d at 
208. 
Miranda Warnings and the 
Utah Constitution 
Finally, defendant claims that regardless 
of the evolution of voluntariness require-
ments under the federal constitution, the 
Elstad doctrine should be rejected under 
our state constitution.5 Defendant argues 
that the state constitutional standard is 
stricter than the federal constitution, and, 
therefore, provides him greater protection. 
Specifically, defendant urges us to reject 
the federal interpretation of Miranda re-
quirements as reflected in Elstad and other 
cases, and retain what he regards as the 
integrity of the Miranda decision as a mat-
ter of state law. Defendant also argues 
5. Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides 
in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." Article I, § 12 of the Utah 
Constitution provides, "The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evid ce against himself." 
for extension of the Miranda doctrine by 
means of the Utah Constitution. 
[13,14] Although the state constitution-
al issue was properly raised before the trial 
court, we need not analyze and address 
every issue on appeal. State v. Carter, 
776 R2d 886^ 888 (Utah 1989). We are 
concerned that a separate state standard 
might generate confusion in this area and 
agree that "there is no value in being dif-
ferent merely for the sake of the differ-
ence." State v. Kell, 303 Or. 89, 734 P.2d 
334, 336 (1987). Therefore, we decline at 
this time to develop a separate constitution-
al standard governing admissibility of con-
fessions under the Utah Constitution.6 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err under the 
United States or Utah Constitutions in de-
nying defendant's motion to suppress his 
post-Mrarato confession. We therefore 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
ORME and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
Virginia B. HALL, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Blaine D. HALL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 920052-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 10, 1993. 
In divorce action, the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., 
ruled that "(w]e do not find, nor has defendant 
identified, principles, precedents or criteria that 
persuade us to adopt a different rule . . . 
'[where] unwarned questioning "did not abridge 
respondent's constitutional privilege . . . but de-
parted only from the prophylactic standards la-
ter laid down bv this Court in Miranda to safe-
HALI 
Cite as 858 l \2d 1 
distributed marital property between par-
ties and imputed income to husband for 
purposes of calculating alimony and child 
support Husband appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court 
was required to deduct wife's contribution 
out of her inheritance from proceeds of 
sale of marital home prior to dividing pro-
ceeds between parties; (2) trial court's fail-
ure to make findings to effect that husband 
was voluntarily underemployed precluded 
finding that imputation of income to hus-
band was proper; (3) trial court's failure to 
make findings, explicit or implicit, concern-
ing prevailing earnings for persons of simi-
lar backgrounds to husband in community 
before calculating amount of income to im-
pute to husband was improper; and (4) 
wife was not entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Divorce <3=»235, 252,1 
Court of Appeals accords trial court 
considerable discretion in determining fi-
nancial interests of divorced parties. 
2. Divorce <3=>239, 253(4) 
Trial court abuses its discretion in de-
termining financial interests of divorced 
parties when it fails to enter specific, de-
tailed findings supporting its financial de-
terminations; findings are adequate only if 
they are sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps 
by which ultimate conclusion on each factu-
al issue is reached. 
3. Divorce <S=>252.5(1) 
Trial court was required to divide pro-
ceeds from sale of marital home equally 
after first subtracting amount necessary to 
reimburse wife's contribution from her in-
heritance or to enter findings supporting 
unequal distribution that resulted when 
court first divided proceeds and then sub-
tracted wife's contribution from husband's 
half of proceeds; trial court made no find-
ings as to any exceptional circumstances 
which took case out of presumptive rule of 
equal distribution of marital property and 
warranted repaying wife's inheritance sole-
v. HALL Utah 1 0 1 9 
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ly out of husband's portion of equity in 
parties' home. 
4. Divorce <3=>253(2) 
Once court makes finding that specific 
item is marital property, law presumes that 
it will be shared equally between parties 
unless unusual circumstances, memoralized 
in adequate findings, require otherwise. 
5. Divorce <s=»239, 307 
Trial court's decision to impute income 
to husband for purposes of child support 
and alimony awards without making any 
explicit finding that husband was underem-
ployed or any subsidiary findings that 
pointed to such determination having been 
made implicitly was substantial departure 
from procedure mandated by Legislature 
and could not be justified merely as failure 
to parrot exact language prescribed by 
statute. U.CJU953, 30-3-10.2(2Xa), 78 -
45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7Xa). 
6. Divorce <£*307 
Findings made by trial court regarding 
amount of income to impute to party in 
divorce action for purposes of child support 
award do not become relevant until after 
court determines, as threshold matter, that 
income should be imputed because party is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
7. Parent and Child <s^3.3(6) 
Findings on the whdfe ate insufficient 
if they omit critical findings required by 
statute governing imputation of income for 
purpose of child support. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
8. Divorce <s=287, 312.7 
Because evidence in divorce action was 
not clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only finding in favor of judg-
ment imputing income to husband for pur-
poses of determining child support and 
spousal support, trial court's decision to 
impute income could not be affirmed on 
basis of undisputed evidence in record; 
parties hotly contested adequacy of hus-
band's efforts to find more gainful employ-
ment and at least some evidence suggested 
that husband's current, diminished income 
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level resulted not from his personal prefer-
ence or voluntary decisions, but instead 
resulted from events beyond his control. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 
78-45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
9. Divorce <S=>286(2), 312.6(3) 
Finding that husband was voluntarily 
underemployed could not properly be im-
plied in divorce action for purposes of de-
termining child support and spousal sup-
port, even though trial court found that 
husband was currently earning less than he 
had previously earned, inasmuch as there 
were no subsidiary findings showing that 
trial court actually found that person with 
husband's abilities could be earning more 
in relevant market U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.-
2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
10. Divorce <3=>287, 312.7 
Even given controverted evidence, 
Court of Appeals could affirm trial court's 
decision to impute income to spouse in di-
vorce action for purposes of child support 
and spousal support, absent outright ex-
pression of statutorily mandated finding, if 
absent findings can reasonably be implied; 
unstated findings can be implied if it is 
reasonable to assume that trial court actu-
ally considered controverted evidence and 
necessarily made finding to resolve contro-
versy, but simply failed to record factual 
determination it made. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-
10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5{7Xa, b). 
11. Divorce <3=>239, 307 
Where court formulates detailed sub-
sidiary findings of fact which underlie find-
ing of underemployment for purposes of 
imputing income to party in divorce action 
on basis of which child support and spousal 
support are determined, and which, by 
themselves, show steps by which court ar-
rived at its apparent conclusion that party 
was underemployed, court's decision to im-
pute income will not be invalidated solely 
on ground that finding of voluntary under-
employment was not couched in exact lan-
guage of statute; this is especially true 
since finding on ultimate issue of voluntary 
underemployment is in reality more like 
legal conclusion and is more meaningfully 
made if supported by underlying findings 
of historical fact. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.-
2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
12. Trial <3=>395(1) 
In many cases, where court fails to 
phrase findings in exact language of stat-
ute, findings nevertheless reflect methodi-
cal and extensively detailed treatment of 
facts, which is often more insightful and 
helpful on appeal than shorter, more curso-
ry recitation of exact statutory language 
would be; such approach frequently pro-
motes more meaningful appellate review 
by providing appellate court with insight 
into steps taken by trial court in arriving at 
its decision. 
13. Appeal and Error <3=>931(3) 
Findings may not be implied when an 
ambiguity of facts make such assumption 
unreasonable. 
14. Divorce <3=>239, 307 
Trial court's failure to make findings, 
explicit or implicit, concerning prevailing 
earnings for persons in community with 
similar backgrounds to husband in order to 
correctly fix amount of income to impute to 
husband for purposes of child support, as-
suming propriety of so imputing income to 
husband, was improper, even though hus-
band's unique position as independent com-
puter consultant, trained in unusual com-
puter language, might render meaningful 
eomp2ri§on of hu§band'§ income with thst 
of other computer programmer/analysts 
difficult; Court of Appeals could not disre-
gard statutory mandate to make such find-
ings solely on basis of litigant's unique 
circumstances. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-
7.5(7)(b). 
15. Divorce <s=>237, 306 
Statute applicable in calculating imput-
ed income for purposes of determining 
child support and spousal support in di-
vorce action did not require comparison 
with persons of exactly same background 
to determine amount of imputed income, 
but court was to evaluate earnings with 
persons of similar backgrounds; thus, with 
respect to husband in unique position as 
independent consultant, trained in unusual 
HALL v. HALL 
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computer language, at minimum, trial 
court was required to undertake some ef-
fort to evaluate employment market for 
computer programmers/analysts in gener-
al, and then make its best effort to adjust 
for husband's unique skills. U.C.A.1953, 
78^5-7.5(7Kb). 
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16. Divorce <$=>287, 312.7 
If on remand trial court finds that 
husband was voluntarily underemployed, it 
was then required to make findings as to 
prevailing earnings for persons of back-
grmind §imikf to tkzt 6f Imt&nd in deter-
mining amount of income to impute to hus-
band for purposes of child support and 
spousal support awards. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-7.5(7Xa, b). 
17. Divorce <$=»224 
Award of attorney fees to wife in di-
vorce action was proper, where wife had 
legal custody of all nine minor children, one 
of whom was autistic and required extra 
attention, and wife presently had no train-
ing or experience which would allow her to 
work outside home. 
18. Divorce <s=*225 
Wife was not entitled to attorney fees 
on husband's appeal from trial court's deci-
sion in divorce action, where except for 
comparatively minor issues, husband pre-
vailed on major issues in dispute and se-
cured remand and reconsideration of is-
sues. 
19. Costs e=>252 
When appeal involves multiple issues, 
party receiving attorney fees below need 
not prevail on every issue in order to be 
awarded fees on appeal. 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant, Blaine Hall, appeals, inter 
alia, the trial court's order distributing 
marital property between the parties and 
imputing income to appellant for purposes 
of calculating alimony and child support. 
We reverse for lack of adequate findings 
and remand. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] This court accords the trial court 
considerable discretion in determining the 
financial interests of divorced parties. 
Alfredv. Alfred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 
App.1990). Although "the court's 'actions 
are entitled to a presumption of validity/ " 
id (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 
1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)), we cannot affirm 
its determination when the trial court abus-
es its discretion. AUred, 797 P.2d at 1111. 
The trial court abuses its discretion when it 
fails to enter specific, detailed findings sup-
porting its financial determinations. See 
id Findings are adequate only if they are 
"sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each fac-
tual issue was reached." Id. (quoting Ste-
vens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 
App.1988)). See also Sukin v. Suki?i, 842 
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.1992) (detailed 
findings are necessary to determine wheth-
er trial court has exercised its discretion in 
a rational manner). 
Appellant raises a number of issues on 
appeal, some of which have no merit and 
require no discussion. Accordingly, we see 
no reason to engage in exhaustive treat-
ment of the facts surrounding the parties' 
divorce. We recite only the pertinent facts 
in the course of treating the issues that 
have merit. 
Richard M. Hutchins, Provo, for defen-
dant and appellant 
Craig M. Snyder and Leslie W. Slaugh, 
Provo, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, 
JJ. 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
[3] During their marriage, the parties 
constructed a home in Alpine, Utah. Prior 
to or during the construction of the home, 
appellee, Virginia Hall, received from her 
father's estate a total of $21,000. Of this 
sum, $6,000 was used as a down payment 
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on the home, and an additional $15,000 was 
contributed toward its construction.1 Dur-
ing the divorce proceedings, the marital 
home was sold. After payment of the ex-
isting mortgage obligation, real estate com-
missions, and other costs of sale, the par-
ties realized a total of $52,403.88 in net 
equity from the sale of the home. As is 
typical, the trial court ordered that the net 
proceeds be divided equally between the 
parties.2 The court then deducted from 
appellant's share certain late fees and de-
linquent interest in the amount of $192.60. 
Next, without explanation or explicit recog-
nition that appellant's separate funds were 
being used to reimburse appellee's contri-
bution to the marital estate, the trial court 
ordered that $21,000 of the remainder of 
appellant's share of the equity be applied to 
reimburse appellee the funds from her in-
heritance which were used in the purchase 
and construction of the parties1 home. Ap-
pellant was therefore left with net pro-
ceeds of approximately $5,000,3 and appel-
lee received approximately $47,000. 
Appellant claims the trial court abused 
its discretion in ordering that appellee's 
inheritance be reimbursed solely from his 
portion of the equity in the home. Rather, 
appellant argues, the trial court should 
have returned appellee's inheritance of 
$21,000 from the total equity of approxi-
mately $52,000, and then distributed the 
remainder of the equity equally between 
the parties. Appellee's contribution of her 
separate funds to the marital estate would 
thereby be repaid from the marital estate, 
and each party would have then been pre-
sumptively entitled to half of the approxi-
mately $31,000 remaining home equity, or 
roughly 515,500. 
[4] In Burt r. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 
(Utah App.1990), this court observed that 
1. The testimony of appellee and her mother 
established the separate nature of these funds. 
Appellant does not dispute the separate nature 
of the funds, nor does he claim that any com-
mingling of these funds with the marital estate 
destroyed their separate nature. 
2. The proceeds from the sale of the parties' 
home ue re deposited into a trust account which 
accrued interest at the rate of $3.67 per day. At 
the time the trial court entered its findings of 
trial courts must distribute property be-
tween the parties to a divorce in a fair, 
systematic fashion. See id. at 1172 & n. 
10. The Burt court noted that the trial 
court should "first properly categorize the 
parties, property as part of the marital 
estate or as the separate property of one or 
the other. Each party is presumed to be 
entitled to all of his or her separate proper-
ty and fifty percent of the marital proper-
ty." Id. at 1172. The Burt court contin-
ued: 
But rather than simply enter such a de-
cree [automatically], the court should 
then consider the existence of exception-
al circumstances and, if any be shown, 
proceed to effect an equitable distribu-
tion in light of those circumstances 
Id. Thus, under Burt, once a court makes 
a finding that a specific item is marital 
property, the law presumes that it will be 
shared equally between the parties unless 
unusual circumstances, memorialized in ad-
equate findings, require otherwise. See 
also Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 
App.1992) (premarital property and inheri-
tances are viewed as separate property, 
and, normally, equity requires that each 
party retain the separate property brought 
to the marriage). 
While conceding that the trial court's 
property division did not result in an equal 
division of the equity, appellee claims the 
trial court was not obligated to distribute 
the equity in the home equally. See New-
meyer v. Neunneyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 n. 
1 (Utah 1987) ("fn determining whether a 
certain division of property is equitable, . . . 
the relative abilities of the spouses to sup-
port themselves after the divorce are perti-
nent to an equitable . . . division of the 
fixed assets of the marriage."). Appellee 
fact, the approximate net equity was $52,741.52. 
After subtracting $592.26, which was applied 
toward payment of a delinquent water bill, the 
court was left with $52,149.26, which it divided 
equally between the parties. 
3. Appellant received exactly $4,882.03 after "re-
paying" $21,000 to appellee. The net amount 
due him v.as applied in full to his delinquent 
child support and alimony. 
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reimbursing her inheri- judge an opportunity to enter findings sup-
porting the unequal distribution, or, in the 
alternative, to divide the proceeds from the 
sale of the home equally after first sub-
tracting the amount necessary to reim-
burse appellee's contribution. See Burt, 
799 P.2d at 1170, 1172. 
contends that in 
tance from appellant's share of the equity, 
the trial court took into account her special 
circumstances, i.e., her lack of education 
and work experience, and the fact that the 
needs of the parties' autistic child and two 
pre-school age children precluded appellee 
from seeking employment outside the 
home. Appellant counters that these con-
cerns were abundantly addressed by means 
of child support and an award of perma-
nent alimony. 
We recognize the power of the trial court 
to effect an equitable distribution of prop-
erty by considering both parties' "contribu-
tions during the marriage and their circum-
stances at the time of the divorce." Id. at 
1278. However, as this court held in Burt, 
"the court's division of the estate cannot 
stand undisturbed when we are not pre-
sented with sufficient findings to demon-
strate that the court's ruling comports with 
established law." 799 P.2d at 1172. 
From all that appears, the court made a 
simple conceptual error in providing for the 
repayment of appellee's inheritance. The 
trial court made no findings as to any 
exceptional circumstances which took this 
case out of the presumptive rule of Burt 
and warranted repaying appellee's inheri-
tance solely out of appellant's portion of 
the equity in the parties' home. Such an 
unequal distribution of the parties* marital 
property' makes no sense in the absence of 
findings justifying the decision, see Wal-
ters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah App. 
1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992), especially since appellee did not seek 
this result on any particular basis and 
where appellee's lack of education and the 
special needs of the children do appear to 
have been thoroughly dealt with in the 
award of permanent alimony and child sup-
port, which we do not disturb. Absent 
findings that would justify departure from 
the presumptive rule of equal distribution, 
we reverse and remand to give the trial 
4. During the divorce proceedings, the trial court 
also received evidence as to the deposits made 
by appellant to his credit union account in Los 
Angeles, California. That account balance to 
tailed approximateh $96,000 in 1990. 
IMPUTATION OF INCOME 
Several years ago, while employed in the 
computer business in California, appellant 
earned a salary of $55,000. Appellant later 
found employment in Utah as a computer 
consultant and software developer and 
worked in that capacity for at least the last 
three years of the parties' marriage. Ap-
pellant's gross earnings listed on his in-
come tax returns for 1988, 1989, and 1990 
averaged in excess of $100,000 per year, 
with average monthly gross earnings in 
excess of $8,500.4 
About ten days before trial, appellant 
started a new job in Vancouver, Washing-
ton, at a salary of $40,000 per year. At 
trial, appellant requested that the court's 
child support and alimony determinations 
be based on his current $40,000 per year 
income level rather than on his historical 
income of approximately $100,000 per 
year.5 On the basis of the evidence intro-
duced at trial as to appellant's income, and 
noting the marked disparity between appel-
lant's $40,000 salary at the time of trial and 
his income over the last three years of his 
marriage, the trial court concluded that the 
only way to accurately gauge appellant's 
income for purposes of determining his 
support obligations was to rely on the his-
torical earnings of appellant. 
The court adopted rather detailed find-
ings of fact based on the evidence adduced 
at trial, which established that appellant's 
average historical income over the three 
and one half years prior to trial amounted 
to $98,498.75 per year, with a rrionthly av-
erage gross income of $8,208.21. 
5. Interestingly, in proposed findings submitted 
to the court just a few days before tiial, appel 
lant included a finding stating he had an in 
come of $66,000 per year. 
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Appellant challenges the trial court's rul-
ings regarding his child support and alimo-
ny obligations insofar as the trial court 
based these obligations on appellant's his-
torical income rather than on his income at 
the time of trial. Appellant's primary ar-
gument in this regard is that the trial court 
erred in imputing income to him without 
explicitly determining that he was volun-
tarily unemployed or underemployed as re-
quired under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
7.5(7)(a) (1992). Additionally, he makes a 
subsidiary claim that in fixing the amount 
of income to be imputed to appellant, the 
trial court failed to follow statutory di-
rectives in assessing his "employment po-
tential and probable earnings" as required 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) 
(1992). 
A. Propriety of Imputation 
[5] In order to evaluate the merit of 
appellant's first imputation argument, we 
must determine whether the trial court's 
decision to impute income was supported 
by adequate findings in light of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7Xa) (1992), which reads: 
"Income may not be imputed to a parent 
unless the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding 
made that the parent is voluntarily unem-
ployed or underemployed."* 
While we agree with appellee that sec-
tion (7)(a) does not specifically require a 
trial court, in making a "finding" of under-
employment, to parrot the exact language 
of the statute, it is well established that 
where a statute expressly requires a trial 
court to make a threshold finding before 
taking specified judicial action, the trial 
court abuses its discretion if it proceeds 
without first making the legislatively man-
dated finding. See Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 
722, 724-25 (Utah App.1992) (court abused 
its discretion by departing from child sup-
port guidelines without first finding that 
following the guidelines would be unjust, 
6. Although in briefing, appellant seems to have 
claimed the tnal court erred in failing to hold a 
separate hearing limited to determining appel-
lant's income for purposes of imputing income 
pursuant to section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), he con-
ceded at oral argument that holding such a 
inappropriate or not in best interest of tl 
child as required by Utah Code Ann. § 1\ 
45-7.2(3) (1992)); Throrison v. Thronso 
810 P.2d 428, 433 (Utah App.) (court abus< 
its discretion by awarding joint legal cust 
dy without first determining that both pa 
ents agreed to the order as required t 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989; 
cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
careful review of the trial court's finding 
reveals not only the absence of any explic 
finding that appellant was underemployed 
but also a lack of subsidiary findings thi 
point to such a determination having bee 
implicitly made. Thus, the court's a] 
proach cannot be justified merely as a fai 
ure to parrot the exact language prescribe 
by the statute, but is instead a substantia 
departure from the procedure mandated b 
the Legislature. 
[6] The court's decision is by no mean 
devoid of detailed factual findings. Indeec 
the trial court entered commendably d( 
tailed findings concerning appellant's hu 
torical income, his present income, and hi 
occupational qualifications. However, th 
extensive detail apparent in the court' 
findings of fact was pertinent to factor 
required under section 78-45-7.5(7)(b)—th 
section detailing factors to consider in ar 
riving at the amount of income to impute 
The findings made by the trial court re 
garding the amount of income to impute 
per section (7)(b), do not become relevan 
until after it determines, as a threshoh 
matter, that income should be imputed be 
cause the parent is voluntarily unem 
ployed or underemployed, as required b> 
section (7)(a). We do know from the find 
ings that appellant now earns considerably 
less than he has in the recent past. We 
can only guess at whether this state oi 
affairs stems from appellant's volition or, 
as he contends, from the simple fact that 
his once-coveted computer expertise in a 
narrow field of business has been rendered 
hearing in a case like the instant one would be 
pointless. We note that in Cummings v. Cum-
mings, 821 P.2d 472, A80 (Utah App. 1991), this 
court upheld the trial court's imputation of in-
come to the wife despite the trial court 's failure 
to hold a separate hearing on the matter. 
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all but obsolete by changes in industry and [9-12] Furthermore, even given contro-
technology. verted evidence, we could affirm the trial 
court's decision to impute income, absent 
[7] The fact that the trial court entered outright expression of the statutorily man-
findings required by section (7)(b) does not dated finding, if the absent findings can 
alter the fact that the trial court failed to reasonably be implied. Unstated findings 
enter any findings required under section can be implied if it is reasonable to assume 
(7)(a). The findings on the whole are insuf- that the trial court actually considered the 
ficient if they omit critical findings re- controverted evidence and necessarily 
quired by the statute. Allred v. Allred, made a finding to resolve the controversy, 
797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.1990). See but simply failed to record the factual de-
also Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909, 911 termination it made. See Slate v. Ra-
(Utah App.1988). Because the findings be- mirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n. 6 (Utah 
fore us do not include any findings to the 1991). See also Adams v. Board of Re-
effect that appellant was voluntarily under- view, 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1991) ("A 
employed, they are statutorily insufficient finding may be implied if it is clear from 
the record, and therefore apparent upon 
[8] The trial court's decision to impute review, that the finding was actually made 
income may nonetheless be affirmed if the as part of the tribtmars derision.^. Thus, 
failure to have made the missing findings where the court formulates detailed subsid-
can be viewed as harmless error. One iary findings of fact which underlie a find-
method is to show that "the undisputed ing of underemployment, and which, by 
evidence clearly establishes the factor or themselves, show the steps by which the 
factors on which findings are missing." court arrived at its apparent conclusion 
Allred, 797 P.2d at 11II. In the case be- that a parent is underemployed under sec-
fore us, at least some evidence suggests tion. 78-45-7.5(7)(a), the court's decision to 
that appellant's current, diminished income impute income will not be invalidated solely 
level resulted not from his personal prefer- on the ground that the "finding" of volun-
ence or voluntary decisions, but instead tary underemployment was not couched in 
resulted from events beyond his control, the exact language of the statute. This is 
For example, appellant claims his clients especially true since a "finding" on the 
did not renew lucrative consulting con- ultimate issue of voluntary underemploy-
tracts, and apparently the only job opportu- ment is in reality more like a legal conclu-
nity available to him was the job he eventu- sion and is more meaningfully made if sup-
ally accepted at $40,000 per year. More- ported by underlying findings of historical 
over, the parties hotly contest the adequacy fact.7 
of appellant's efforts to find more gainful 
employment Accordingly, because the evi- [13] Findings may not be implied, how-
dence in this case is not "clear, uncontro- ever, when the "ambiguity of the facts" 
verted, and capable of supporting only a makes such an assumption unreasonable, 
finding in favor of the judgment," we can- Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788. This court re-
not affirm on the basis of undisputed evi- cently held that we will not imply any 
dence in the record. Kinkella v. Baugh, missing finding where there is a "matrix of 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). possible factual findings" and we cannot 
7. In many cases, where a court fails to phrase 
findings in the exact language of the statute, the 
findings nevertheless reflect methodical and ex-
tensively detailed treatment of the facts, which 
is often more insightful and helpful on appeal 
than a shorter, more cursory recitation of the 
exact statutory language would have been. 
Such an approach frequently promotes more 
meaningful appellate review by providing the 
appellate court with insight into the steps taken 
by the trial court in arriving at its decision. Cf. 
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl Quality, 
843 P.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Utah App.1992) (con-
trasting commendable detail of findings made 
by administrative law judge with sparse, conciu-
sory findings made by department head and 
remanding for more adequate findings "to more 
fully articulate" reasons for department head's 
decision). 
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ascertain the trial court's actual findings. 
Sec Adams, 821 P.2d at 6. 
A finding that appellant was voluntarily 
underemployed cannot properly be implied 
in this case. Although the trial court 
found that appellant is currently earning 
less than he was previously, that isolated 
finding does not answer the critical ques-
tion of whether the drop in earnings was 
voluntary. Rather, appellant's current 
earnings, as compared to his historical in-
come, is merely one element in the matrix 
of factual issues affecting the ultimate 
finding of whether appellant is underem-
ployed. Many critical questions are left 
unanswered: What are appellant's abili-
ties? Is appellant's current salary below 
the prevailing market for a person with his 
abilities? Are there any job openings for a 
person with appellant's abilities? At a min-
imum, the trial court must determine appel-
lant's employment capacity and earnings 
potential—which it failed to do even in its 
determination of the amount to impute un-
der section'(7)(b)—before it could logically 
conclude that he is, in fact, underemployed. 
Inasmuch as there are no subsidiary find-
ings showing that the trial court actually 
found that a person with appellant's abili-
ties could be earning more in the relevant 
market, we cannot imply a finding that 
appellant is underemployed. We accord-
ingly reverse the trial court's determina-
tion that appelant is underemployed and 
remand for evaluation of that issue and the 
entry of appropriate findings. 
B. Amount of Imputed Income 
[14] Appellant additionally argues that 
even assuming the propriety of imputing 
additional income to him, the trial court 
incorrectly fixed the amount of income to 
impute as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1992). That section pro-
vides that "[i]f income is imputed to a 
parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earn-
8. Appellant contends his once-lucrative market 
niche has been lost due to the ability of his 
former customers to now do the work he had 
previously done using their own employees. In-
deed, a company would be unlikely to expend 
extravagant amounts for independent consult 
ings as derived from work history, occupa-
tion qualifications, and prevailing earnings 
for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community." Id. Appellant specifically 
assigns error to the court's failure to ade-
quately address "employment potential and 
probable earnings." Id. The point is well 
made. 
As previously noted, the trial court made 
elaborate underlying findings regarding ap-
pellant's work history and prior earnings, 
based on tax returns and bank records, and 
occupational qualifications, based on his 
employment history. Yet the court made 
no findings, explicit or implicit, concerning 
"prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community" as re-
quired by section (7)(b). 
[15] Although appellant's unique posi-
tion as an independent consultant, trained 
in an unusual computer language, might 
render meaningful comparison of appel-
lant's income with that of other computer 
programmer/analysts difficult, we cannot 
disregard a statutory mandate solely on 
the basis of a litigant's unique circum-
stances. The statute does not require a 
comparison with persons of exactly the 
same background, but instructs courts to 
evaluate earnings "for persons of similar 
backgrounds." Id. (emphasis added). 
White an abundance of independent pro-
grammers might not inhabit the local mar-
ket, surely computer programmers in di-
verse positions must be employed locally 
under circumstances which would permit 
some level of meaningful comparison. If 
an adequate pool of consultant program-
mer/analysts cannot be discovered, employ-
ee programmers who engage in similar pro-
gramming activities might provide a useful 
comparison.8 At a minimum, the trial 
court must undertake some effort to evalu-
ate the employment market for program-
mers in general, and then make its best 
ing services if it could utilize in-house program-
mers to accomplish the same goals less expen-
sively. If appellant's premise is sound, employ-
ee programmers may well prove to be the only 
reliable reference point. 
effort to 
skills. 
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adjust for appellant's unique 
[16] Accordingly, if upon remand the 
trial court finds that appellant was volun-
tarily underemployed, it must then make 
findings as to prevailing earnings for per-
sons of backgrounds similar to that of ap-
pellant, as required by section (7)(b), in 
determining the amount of income to im-
pute. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
[17] Despite the fact that appellee has 
legal custody of all nine minor children, one 
of whom is autistic and requires extra at-
tention, and despite the fact that she pres-
ently has no training or experience which 
wtiufcf affow ner to work outside the home, 
appellant argues that the court failed to 
make sufficient factual findings to support 
its award of attorney fees to appellee. We 
include appellant's challenge to the trial 
court's award of attorney fees among those 
previously characterized as being without 
merit and accordingly leave the award un-
disturbed. 
[18,19] Appellee, on the other hand, 
claims she is entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. "Generally, when the trial court 
awards fees in a domestic action to the 
party who then substantially prevails on 
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal" Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 
P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah App.1992). See also 
Burt v, Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 
App. 1990). When an appeal involves multi-
ple issues, the party receiving attorney 
fees below need not prevail on every issue 
in order to be awarded fees on appeal See 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 
1991) (party who "prevailed on the main 
issue on appeal" received fees); Ostler v. 
Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App.1990) 
(party prevailing on child support issue, but 
losing on issue of dividing retirement ac-
count with nominal value, received fees). 
In contrast to the instant case, Bell, Lyn-
gle, and Ostler were all situations where 
the party seeking attorney fees on appeal 
prevailed on the most significant issues in 
controversy. Here, except for the compar-
atively minor issues we dismissed out of 
hand, appellant prevailed on the major is-
sues in dispute. He secured remand and 
reconsideration of both the home equity 
distribution and the imputation of income. 
Appellee therefore is not entitled to attor-
ney fees related to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In allocating equity in the parties' home, 
the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings to justify its departure from the 
presumptive rule of equal distribution of 
property. We further agree with appellant 
that the court erred by not making the 
statutorily mandated findings that he was 
underemployed as a prerequisite to its deci-
sion to impute income to appe)lanL If 
upon remand for the forgoing issues, the 
court adheres to its decision to impute in-
come to appellant, it must consider "pre-
vailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community" in setting 
the amount to impute. Finally, we leave 
undisturbed the trial court's award of at-
torney fees to appellee, but refuse to 
award fees to her for this appeal. We 
accordingly reverse and remand for further 
findings consistent with this opinion. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
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